The paper deals with the questions of funding of collective actions. Proper funding has significant influence on the right to the access to the court and is a precondition for the efficient course of litigation in general, specifically in connection with a collective redress. Funding of class actions is also closely related with other issues such as costs and lawyer´s fees, reimbursement of legal costs and moreover.
Introduction
There is an increasing number of cases in which a large group of persons has suffered harm as a result of the same illegal practice by a particular entity.
2 This typically occurs in relation to consumer rights, competition rights, financial services, securities, environmental protection, as well as in many other areas.
This phenomenon can then be reflected in procedural law as the growing number of disputes in which the subject-matter of the procedure and the defendants are identical. Naturally, it is then contrary to the principle of procedural economy and speed for these disputes to be dealt with separately. However, the enormous number of applicants often prevents the consolidation of these actions, both technically and administratively. In the second half of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the 21 st century, "collective protection of rights" in the form of "collective actions" is therefore becoming increasingly important. Their purpose is not only to resolve the above situation, but also to prevent that the persons whose rights have been affected waive their right to judicial protection. Individual persons often assert only petty claims (although adding up to a large amount in aggregate) and, therefore, they decide not to bring an action 1 This article was supported by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic -the project Collective protection of rights in the Czech Republic -current situation and the way forward (GA16-06065S). 2 See also article 2 of the Preamble to Commission Recommendation No 2013/396/EU on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law.
due to concerns about the procedural costs and the time needed ("rational apathy"). This is also related to a possible preventive effect of legislation on collective redress.
The European Union is also aware of the importance of collective protection of rights. The EU has so far focused on collective protection of rights to varying degrees in a number of documents aimed at specific areas of rights protection. A decisive step towards the general regulation of collective redress was the adoption of Commission Recommendation No 2013/396/EU on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law (hereinafter the "Recommendation"). It presents a set of principles of judicial and out-ofcourt collective redress, which should be common in the legal systems across the Union, both for injunctive and compensatory relief. The Recommendation also quite extensively addresses the issue of funding of collective actions. 
General Definition of Issues Concerning Collective Actions
Sufficient funding contributes significantly to the exercise of the right of access to a court and is one of the conditions for the proper course of litigation. It will also allow the defendant to successfully enforce its right to the reimbursement of costs if the defendant is successful, and the "loser pays" principle is applied when deciding on the reimbursement of litigation costs. The importance of litigation funding then increases in the case of judicial collective redress. Naturally, judicial collective redress litigation involves increased costs (e.g. the cost of presenting evidence, representation costs). 4 In addition, those are incurred by a single person. 5 The group members are not responsible for the funding of the procedure. An exception is made for the costs of individual nature, e.g. cost of evidence proving the facts relating only to a specific person, or costs incurred in filing an appeal if it is permitted by law for individual group members to file an appeal against particular decisions. Different regulation could have a deterrent effect on judicial collective redress litigation, although some form of co-payment is not ruled out. It is for these reasons that the Recom- On the other hand, the costs incurred will in aggregate be generally lower than in the case of individual procedures, which is an undeniable advantage of collective redress litigation. 5 Naturally, the costs are not incurred only during litigation, but may already be incurred in the preparatory phase, e.g. the cost of the publicity about the intention to file a collective action, the cost of collecting information on possible other persons affected, the coordination of these persons, etc. See also the study of BEUC. The obligation to ensure sufficient funds for the litigation process and declare to the court the origin of the funds is clearly applied in the case of "representative actions", where the representative entity has the standing to bring a representative action. Although one of the prerequisites for the designation of a suitable representative entity is also sufficient capacity in terms of financial resources (Article 4 of the Recommendation) 6 , litigation may also be funded from other sources. Therefore, a representative entity must also declare to the court the origin of the litigation funds.
In the case of collective actions, there are multiple entities within the claimant party, the claimant and group representative playing a fundamental role. These two entities need not be identical -the claimant need not subsequently also become the group representative. Therefore, the question is who has the obligation to declare to the court the origin of the litigation funds. The payment of litigation costs is at first associated with the person of the claimant, until certification, i.e. a kind of recognition of group procedure by the court in which a group representative is appointed. The question of funding and demonstration of sufficient funds should therefore be associated with certification. The certification decision should designate a group representative from among persons who, in addition to other requirements, also guarantee sufficient and proper litigation funding. This is one of the reasons why certification should take place at the initial stage of litigation (see also Article 8 of the Recommendation). 7 However, the court must take account of sufficient litigation funding throughout the procedure, i.e. even after the actual certification.
The procedure may also be funded using the funds of the representative entity or group representative 8 , or using third-party funding (TPFL). In a collective action based on an opt-in, own funding may be supplemented to include contributions of other group members (e.g. in the form of an advance payment).
6 If such predetermined entities cease to meet the specified requirements, their entitlement must be terminated. However, the court may not revoke the entitlement to bring an action, although it may discontinue litigation because funding resources have been declared insufficiently. 7 Due to procedural economy and speed, certification is a more or less necessary step to be taken by a court in any legislative regulation governing collective actions, because the court can clearly state whether an action and the consequently initiated litigation may be approached as a collective redress procedure. This decision can be appealed. After the decision on certification becomes final and enforceable, the court continues with procedure on the merits. In an appeal against a decision issued in the second stage of the procedure, one may no longer argue that the prerequisites for collective redress procedure were not met. 8 For the sake of simplification, the text will hereinafter only refer to a group representative, even where the representative entity is also concerned.
This obligation may be imposed on group members directly by law (mandatory contributions). However, it may dissuade the affected persons from participating in the litigation. Co-financing of litigation by group members should therefore rather be based on an agreement between the group representative and the group members, without negative consequences for individual members who do not contribute (e.g. in the form of termination of participation in the litigation).
9
The group representative may request individual members of the group to provide cooperation, and may do so itself, or through a court. Given that a court designates the group representative also with regard to the demonstration of sufficient litigation funds, the agreement should be made before group certification, of course with a possible extension after the certification resolution during the litigation. Since the amount of the costs is unclear at the beginning of the litigation, and it is therefore not possible at an early stage of the litigation to choose the adequate amount of the advance payment, this method of funding may be unsuitable for all the persons involved. In the case of representative litigations, the representative entity may be (co-)funded based on the contributions of each of the persons concerned, without a direct connection to a specific litigation.
10

Third Party Funding of a Collective Redress Procedure
The relationship between a third party and group representative is contractual ("funding agreement"). In addition to questions concerning the scope of funding or remuneration for the funder, the agreement may address e.g. confidentiality of the group representative, or of the group members and funder.
11
A third person is a person whose rights or legally protected interests are not the subject of the procedure; therefore, the third person is not the group representative or group member and it is usually not involved in the matter that is the subject of dispute. However, it is not excluded that the funder is the lawyer of the group representative.
A third party provides the group representatives with the funds to conduct the litigation; the agreement may also include a commitment to reimburse the costs of the other party if it wins the case.
12 It is not excluded that a third person the third party will naturally require relatively detailed information on the subject-matter of the procedure. 12 The obligation to reimburse will lie with the group representative. However, if the group representative fails to fulfil this obligation voluntarily, the defendant will be allowed to and the group representative only agree on the funding of the litigation costs in the case of a failure in the case, and the actual litigation will be funded by group representative from its own resources.
Third party funding does not affect collective redress procedures, but is also used in conventional court proceedings. 13 It gained popularity in the mid1990s, and is currently quite common in common law countries (Australia, USA, UK) 14 , and, to a lesser extent, even in civil law countries (Germany, Switzerland, Austria).
Third-party litigation funding is usually not regulated in detail in the individual countries. 15 However, an appropriate regulation would act not only as a safe- guard against possible abuse of collective action (in the form of vexatious actions or the pursuit of the interests of the funder), but would also lead to improving the position of the group representative.
Special attention in relation to litigation is paid to those forms of funding where the return on the funds provided by a third party and its reward is tied to the outcome of the procedure, especially in the case of contingency fees. 16 It is especially here that the third-party funder may actively intervene in the litigation and influence it through its actions.
Sources of third-party litigation funding include particularly 17 :
Funding by individuals
The funding generally takes the form of a gift, with loans also being possible. Naturally, these are disadvantageous for the group representative, because they must be repaid even if the case is lost. In the case of this method of funding, the funder and group representative essentially have a personal relationship that leads to the provision of funds; the funds are not provided for profit, or profit is not the main purpose.
Legal Expenses Insurance
Legal expenses insurance is a separate branch of insurance. It is usually taken out in the context of comprehensive policy concluded for multiple insurance risks. The funds are provided by the insurer -a public insurance company. Legal expenses insurance protects the insured person against the adverse consequences of litigation. 18 The scope of insurance may vary; in connection with litigation, it may involve the payment of costs incurred by the counterparty, as well as the costs incurred by the group representative. There are two types of this insurance. 16 Contingency fees are most often mentioned in connection with legal representation fees; however, it is also related to third-party litigation funding. The Recommendation mentions contingency fees for legal representation in Article 30. In Article 32, contingency fees are mentioned in connection with third-party litigation funding. In both cases, this method of remuneration is subject to the same rules. 17 The paper disregards the possibility of assignment of claims as one of the possible special types of third-party litigation funding. (a) Before the event (BTE) insurance. This insurance is taken out in case of future litigation. This type of insurance is relatively widespread. 19 However, it usually only covers the actual litigation costs of the group representative or group members, and therefore it is necessary to also take out after the event insurance to cover any litigation costs incurred by the counterparty. 20 (b) After the event (ATE) insurance. It is an insurance taken out after the dispute. This type of insurance is less common than BTE, it is used esp. in the UK. 21 However, litigation funding through legal expenses insurance is not very convenient for the funding of collective redress procedures, because the coverage limit may be too low for this type of control. Also, insurance companies may have no interest in funding disputes which will bring benefit to persons other than the insured persons, i.e. members of the group. 
Banks and other financial institutions
Banks and other financial institutions assume the costs and risks associated with litigation. Repayment of funds may be contingent on the success in the case where banks also get a share of the award. 23 Therefore, its nature is in this case analogous to the contingency fee. It is therefore a form of investment for the bank. However, banks may also provide the funds on credit. provided funds and remuneration is, again, contingent on the outcome of the litigation. If the case is won, the investor gets a certain percentage of the awarded amount, or a multiple of the costs incurred.
Special institutional investors
Public funds 25
This type of funding is rather typical for representative litigation. 26 The provision of financial resources from the fund is subject to predetermined criteria, e.g. whether the applicant has attempted to obtain the funds from other sources, whether there is a public interest in the litigation, and whether there is any hope of success.
27 Special funds to finance collective actions have been set up e.g. in Canada (Ontario and Quebec -Class Action Assistance Fund), Israel, Hong Kong, Australia or Austria. The scope of funding tends to be different; some exclude lawyer's fees (Ontario), others exclude reimbursement of costs incurred by counterparties in the case of failure in the case (Quebec). If the case is successful, the claimant may be obliged to pay a certain amount of the award into the fund (Ontario -10%). It is non-profit private funding. It is again typical for representative litigation where the representative entity funds the litigation using his own resources. However, this does not always have to be so. These resources may also be provided to support class action proceedings.
7.
Collective redress procedure may also be funded by a lawyer of the group representative, most commonly based on lawyer's contingency fees (also termed pactum de quota litis, no win no fee, or no success no pay). The payment of the fee is contingent on the success in the case. In this case, lawyers represent and fund the claimant at the same time; however, it is also possible that the lawyer only funds the claimant. 29 In the case of contingency fees, the lawyer's remuneration is a percentage of the recovered amount.
In addition to contingency fees, there are also conditional fee arrangements or success fee arrangements. 30 In this case, the lawyer gets a regular hourly rate plus bonus (in the form of a lump sum or a certain percentage of the remuneration; however, the amount is not derived from the recovered amount).
31
In some jurisdictions, this method of funding / lawyer's fee may be restricted. For example, in Sweden, contingency fees in its classic form are prohibited; however, the Swedish Group Proceedings Act allows the conclusion of a risk agreement (riskavtal). In this agreement, the group representative and the lawyer may agree on an increased fee for the lawyer if he wins the case and, conversely, on a reduced fee in the case of his failure in the case. 32 However, this agreement must be approved by a court; only then it becomes effective towards other members of the group [Articles 38 and 39 of Group Proceedings Act 2002:599)]. 33 Contingency fees are also prohibited in Austria (see Section 879(2)(2) of the ABGB).
34
Contingency fees are partially permitted in Germany or England and Wales. 35 The Polish act does not prohibit contingency fee agreements. 36 In the Czech 
Pro bono representation
This type of funding is limited to legal representation costs and does not apply to the funding of the entire litigation. Pro bono legal services are provided on a completely voluntary basis.
Legal aid
Sometimes also incorrectly called pro bono. Legal aid also particularly concerns legal representation. In this case, legal representation funds are provided by the State, which pays certain amounts to the association of lawyers, which then distributes them to specific lawyers. The decision on the application for legal aid is made by a court, the Bar Association or some other designated public authority. Legal aid is usually available only for a small number of beneficiaries (the test examines the financial situation of the applicant and reasonable merits -means and merits tests).
37
Other possible methods of litigation funding also include crowdfunding. 38 The contributor's fee depends on success in the case. It is possible to consider the creation of a special fund at EU level where successful applicants would contribute. They would be encouraged to transfer the recovered amount or its part to the fund. 39 would bring other problems, e.g. the appropriate definition of the mechanisms to decide on the collective actions to be funded, the criteria to be chosen, etc.
Positive and Negative Aspects of Third-Party Litigation Funding
Third-party litigation funding is in many cases the only way to ensure the constitutionally guaranteed right of access to a court, right to a proper procedure and also to ensure that the defendant obtains the right to the reimbursement of litigation costs if it wins the case.
On the other hand, this may bring many pitfalls, especially where a third party is compensated for the amount it provides and fee or interest only if the party which the third party financially supports wins the case.
Probably the biggest concerns relate to the potential increase in the number of litigations. Particularly contingency fees may encourage funders to actively seek disputes (in this context, lawyers are often referred to as private attorney generals 40 ).
However, a third-party funder that is required under the agreement to receive the fee or its substantial part depending on the outcome of the litigation will generally consider what disputes to finance, i.e. what is the real chance of success in each case. 41 Those that use this method of funding for multiple disputes may of course balance their investments by investing in cases whose outcome is uncertain (but the potential amount to be recovered is high). However, this should not be considered a negative aspect, because in these cases the claimant retains his right of access to a court and the right to judicial protection. 42 Conversely, in more complex cases whose outcome cannot be predicted, the group representative may have difficulty in finding a person willing to fund the litigation, and such a third party may also dictate terms very unfavourable to the claim- ant. The consideration whether to fund a particular litigation, can be affected by the amount claimed, or the defendant and his readiness to pay any recovered amount and pay the litigation costs, as well as the nature of the dispute or the presented claim.
43
The determination of the amount of funder's fee as such need not be advantageous for the group representative / group members. In the absence of any regulation, it is purely up to the parties to the contract to agree the amount. The fee will probably increase in proportion to the risk of failure in the case. The supported person must therefore consider in advance the amount of the fee which is still acceptable for him and the members of the group. If any of the members of the group disagrees with the amount, such a member still has the right to litigate individually.
Where the fee is contingent on the outcome of the litigation, one must consider the possible effort of the funder to influence the proceedings. However, the interests of the third party funder and the group representative / the group itself may be different. This may create conflict of interest between these entities during litigation. 44 This may manifest itself e.g. by the third party forcing the group representative (and, through the group representative, the lawyer) to sign an agreement which is disadvantageous for the claimant. Conversely, the funder may try to prevent the conclusion of the agreement between the group representative and the defendant if the agreement is not advantageous for the funder.
The relation between the funder and the group representative's lawyer may also be problematic. Only a group representative may grant the power of attorney to the lawyer. However, it cannot be excluded that the funder will try to influence the group representative's choice of the lawyer. However, according to ethical rules, the legal representative should always act in the interest of the client and on its instructions. 45 The group representative's lawyer is often the funder. In this case, the conflict of interest may be obvious, as the interests of the lawyer as the funder will be completely different from those of a mere lawyer. . I believe that if the judge is aware of the identity of the funder and there is a reason to doubt his impartiality, this should constitute grounds for the disqualification of the judge from the consideration of the case. However, this may cause problems with regard to a statutory judge in the case of causal jurisdiction of courts dealing with these cases. 45 However, it cannot be ruled out that the group representative will give instructions to the lawyer in accordance with the instructions of the funder.
Third-party litigation funding may also lead to a situation where the funder's main motive to provide funds is to harm the defendant, for example where the defendant is the funder's competitor. 46 It is clear that in addition to positive aspects, third-party litigation funding also brings about many negative ones. Legal systems of individual states, however, generally do not contain any safeguards to avoid these negative aspects and do not allow for the obligation of the group representative to declare to the court whether the litigation is funded by a third party.
Safeguards Against Abuse Laid Down in the Commission Recommendation
The regulation of third-party litigation funding in legislation concerning collective judicial redress must ensure that the aforementioned adverse effects on litigation are minimized. In judicial collective redress procedures, courts have a specific position. Litigation concerns the rights and legitimate interests of a large number of entities. Members of the group may not influence the litigation process, or may do so only to a limited extent. The court appoints a group representative that conducts the litigation for other members.
The European Union is aware of the possible abuse of collective action, also through its funding. Article 13 of the Preamble to the Recommendation states that "principles [of the Recommendation] should ensure that fundamental procedural rights of the parties are preserved and should prevent abuse through appropriate safeguards. Article 19 of the Preamble to the Recommendation then, in connection with the litigation funding, states that the availability of funding for collective redress litigation should be arranged in such a way that it cannot lead to an abuse of the system or a conflict of interest. The text of the Recommendation then defines certain safeguards to fulfil this general proclamation. 47 A court must therefore ensure that the litigation is free from violations of the rights of group members ("litigation management"), also in relation to the funding of collective actions. 48 However, the legislation governing the funding of collective actions must not consequently lead to a de facto prevention of access to a court, must comply with both requirements and establish a natural balance between them. 49 It is often the 46 The Recommendation also draws attention to situations where the funder is dependant on the defendant (Article 16 of the Recommendation). 47 The question of funding is regulated in Part III of the Recommendation (Principles common to injunctive and compensatory collective redress), Articles 14, 15 and 16. 48 The intensity of court interventions in litigation should also depend on the nature of the parties and the subject matter of the dispute. The situation in consumer claims may be different from cases concerning corporate law. 49 Even European Justice Forum (a group of large international companies, whose aim is to create a fair, balanced and effective legal environment for consumers and entrepreneurs) funding agreement that allows the group representative (the group members) to exercise its right to access to a court, and eliminates or reduces the risks associated with adverse outcome of litigation.
According to Article 14 of the Recommendation, the claimant party should be required to declare to the court at the outset of the proceedings the origin of the funds that it is going to use to support the legal action.
If the procedure is to be funded by a third party, the court will require the submission of a funding agreement. 50 The scope of third party funding is left up to the parties of the agreement; the funding may include legal representation, evidence costs, or the reimbursement of litigation costs in the case of failure.
51
The court will determine whether a third party has sufficient resources to meet its financial obligations to the claimant initiating collective action. In addition, it must also be clear to the court whether the claimant party has sufficient resources to meet any adverse costs should the collective redress procedure fail. (Article 15 of the Recommendation). The degree to which litigation funding was provided will be considered by the judge. It will obviously be difficult due to the fact that costs cannot be clearly identified in advance. If the court concludes that resources are not sufficient, the group representative cannot be appointed, and unless there is another suitable representative, the group cannot be certified.
The court must take account of proper funding throughout the litigation process. If it finds that there has been a change in the facts relating to litigation funding, it should give the claimant party a space to remedy. The Recommendation talks about the possibility of the court to stay the proceedings (Article 15 of states that collective actions will not be used without a liberal set of rules for funding. However, it also says that if the possibility of financial gain from litigation funding is high enough to support funding, it is also high enough to carry the risk of abuse. See <www. europeanjusticeforum.org>, cited according to HIGGINS, Andrew, ZUCKERMAN, Adrian A. S. Class actions in England? Efficacy, autonomy and proportionality in collective redress. Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper, 2013, no. 93, p. 41. Also available at: <http:// ssrn.com/abstract=2350141>. Higgins and Zuckerman, however, add that the lack of incentives for litigation also provides a good reason for international companies to violate competition rules and consumer protection rules at the expense of those who buy their products or use their services. According to these authors, the prospect of profit leading to an action being filed works as a certain counterbalance to the prospect of profit by the breach of rules where there is very little chance of public enforcement. Ibid. 50 The agreement will be concluded between the group representative and the third party.
However, it is not excluded that a third party may insist on the agreement being concluded with all members of the group. MULHERON, Rachael. the Recommendation) if financial resources are provided by a third party and it does not have sufficient resources to meet its financial obligations towards the claimant party initiating collective action. The court will act analogously if the claimant party (including its funder) has insufficient funds to cover the expenses of the counterparty if it fails the case. If the claimant party fails to provide for the necessary funds within a specified period, the court must remove the original representative and appoint a new one. If the group does not include a person who could be the group representative, it will lead to the decertification of the group, i.e. a de facto termination of the collective redress procedure and its discontinuation. The court should revoke the certification decision. 52 This is obviously a very sensitive issue; one must take into account the costs already incurred and the efforts and interests of group members.
53
If litigation is to be funded by a third party, the court must also verify whether or not there is a conflict of interest between the group representative and the funder, a relationship between the funder and the defendant, and also prevent potential influence on the process steps of the group representative by the funder.
Article 16 of the Decision expressly provides, inter alia, that Member States should ensure, that in cases where an action for collective redress is funded by a private third party, it is prohibited for the private third party to seek to influence procedural decisions of the claimant party, including on settlements, and to provide financing for a collective action against a defendant who is a competitor of the fund provider or against a defendant on whom the fund provider is dependant.
The third party may actually influence the group representative in the litigation process, and if its interests are different from the interests of the group, it may have a negative impact on the litigation process. However, it would be naive to assume that a third party, especially if its fee is contingent, will stand idly dur-ing the litigation. 54 "Influencing" is in the legitimate interest of third parties. 55 However, it is essential that the interest of third parties does not prevail over the legitimate interests of the claimant group. The court must assess the influence of the third party on the litigation and its correctness. 56 Any subsequent actions taken by the court will be the same as in the above case.
The safeguards to avoid increasing the number of collective redress procedures and reducing the recovered amount also include restrictions on contingency fees. The Recommendation tends to reject this type of funding and remuneration of lawyers for legal representation. 57 The Commission therefore allowed contingency fees under the condition that Member States will adequately regulate these fees 58 and, in particular, take into account the rights of the claimant party members to a full reimbursement. Solutions could include the provision of the maximum percentage. It should also be prohibited to charge excessive interest on the funds provided. (Article 16 of the Recommendation).
Aspects discouraging from an apparently unsuccessful exercise or protection of rights also include the rule contained in Article 13 of the Recommendation, and the reimbursement of litigation costs depending on the outcome of the case. 59 The abuse of collective actions is also to be avoided by an adequate statutory court fee.
Conclusion
The issue of funding plays a key role in collective judicial redress. Only sufficiently and properly funded judicial procedure is capable of fulfilling its role and providing all interested parties with the space to exercise their rights. With regard to the increased costs in the collective redress procedures, third party litigation funding is used more than in any other type of procedure. It is often only thanks to this type of funding that claimants can exercise their right of access to a court. There are a number of methods of third-party financing; individual methods can also be combined or used to supplement the claimant's own resources. However, third party funding can also lead to the abuse of collective actions, especially where third party funding is based on contingency fees. The main concern relates to the increase in the number of judicial procedures, but also to the potential influence of the funding provider on the procedure. Particularly where the interests of the group representative, or the group and a third party are in an apparent conflict, collective actions can be exploited in the competition between the defendant and the fund provider.
In order to avoid these negative aspects, it is necessary to regulate third party funding in a certain way. The Recommendation proposes a set of principles, also in the funding of collective redress actions, which EU Member States should transpose into their national legal systems, the basic principle being the obligation of the claimant to declare to the court the origin of the funds for collective redress procedures. Their specific implementation will then depend on the legislative regulation of the Member State.
However, the degree of regulation must be set so as not to result in a de facto exclusion of that method of funding. Individual countries must therefore adopt such regulation which reduces the above mentioned negative effects, while not deterring third parties from funding collective redress procedures. Whether or not individual Member States permit contingency fees to a certain limited extent is likely to be crucial. If contingency fees are completely prohibited, the group of entities willing to finance litigation will be significantly reduced, making further safeguards against abuse practically redundant. 60 60 As a result, funders will be able to set less favourable conditions for group representatives.
